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use#LAAWHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?*
ROBERT J. BARRO AND RACHEL M. MCCLEARY
Among 188 countries, 72 had no state religion in 2000, 1970, and 1900; 58 had
a state religion throughout; and 58 had 1 or 2 transitions. We use a Hotelling
spatial competition model to analyze the likelihood that the religion market would
be monopolized. Similar forces inﬂuence a government’s decision to establish a
state religion. Consistent with the model, the probability of state religion in 1970
and 2000 is increasing with the adherence rate to the main religion, has a
nonlinear relation with population, and has little relation with per capita GDP.
The probability of state religion decreases sharply under Communism, but lagged
Communism has only a weak effect. With costly adjustment for institutions, the
probability of state religion in 1970 or 2000 depends substantially on the status in
1900. This persistence is much stronger for countries with no major regime change
than for countries with such a change.
State religion plays a central role in Adam Smith’s vision of
the religion market [1791, Book V, Article III]. According to
Smith, the key aspect of state religion is its promotion of the
monopoly position of the favored religion, partly through limita-
tions on entry and partly through subsidies. Smith argues that
the low service quality of monopoly religion providers reduces
religious participation and beliefs. This argument has been
broadened in the “religion-market model” by Finke and Stark
[1992], Iannaccone [1991], and Finke and Iannaccone [1993].
Our previous research [Barro and McCleary 2006] investi-
gated the effects of state religion on religiosity. We found, con-
trary to Smith, that the presence of state religion raised religious
participation and beliefs. These relationships applied when we
held ﬁxed a measure of government regulation of the religion
market, based on whether the government appointed or approved
religious leaders. Our interpretation was that, for given regula-
tion, the state-religion variable picked up subsidies that fostered
organized religion. Consistent with the religion-market model,
regulation depressed religious participation and beliefs. Addi-
tional research [Barro and McCleary 2003] showed that, by af-
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1331fecting religious participation and beliefs, state religion mattered
for economic growth.
In the present study, we try to explain the choice of state
religions. Aside from the interplay with economic growth, this
choice is interesting for economists because, over the past 2000
years, state monopoly over religion has probably been the single
most important form of state monopoly in existence. The choice of
a state religion is a political calculus that involves interactions
between the government and the religion sector. Our analysis
accords in spirit with Gill’s [2002], who argued that studies of
religious liberty should take the form of positive analyses of why
the government regulates religious organizations in a particular
way.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND MEASURES OF STATE RELIGION
Many state religions go back hundreds of years and were
introduced for reasons independent of forces that operated in the
twentieth century. For example, the Protestant Reformation ini-
tiated by Martin Luther, John Calvin, and Ulrich Zwingli in the
early 1500s ﬂourishes today in various forms throughout the
world. Historically, political leaders have been even more impor-
tant than theological ones in inﬂuencing the institutionalization
of religion. For England, the current Anglican environment re-
ﬂects Henry VIII’s ouster of the Catholic Church in 1534, pur-
portedly over the Pope’s refusal to grant permission for a divorce
but probably more related to the conﬁscation of church property.
Similarly, the long-lasting presence of the Lutheran state church
in Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia stems from the ouster of
the Catholic Church in Sweden by King Gustaf Vasa in 1527, also
motivated by the taking of church property.
Our analysis does not attempt to explain the motivations of
Henry VIII in 1534 or Gustaf Vasa in 1527. Going back further,
we also do not explain why the Orthodox Church separated from
the Roman Catholic Church in the Great Schism of 1054, why
Christianity and Islam became the state religions of many coun-
tries much earlier, or why Buddhism arose out of Hinduism in
India some 500 years before Christ and gradually became prom-
inent in parts of East Asia. Operationally, we take as given the
status of state religion in a region at some point in the past and,
for us, the relevant date is a relatively recent one, 1900. This year
1332 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSis the earliest time at which we have a broad classiﬁcation of
countries in terms of state religions.
In this study, we categorize ofﬁcial state religion as an all-
or-nothing choice, and we focus on three dates at which we have
data: 2000, 1970, and 1900. Our classiﬁcations come primarily
from Barrett [1982, pp. 800–801] and Barrett, Kurian, and John-
son [2001, pp. 834–835], subsequently referred to as Barrett.
These sources provide global coverage on a reasonably consistent
basis. Although the designations are inﬂuenced by legal provi-
sions, including statements about religion in constitutions, the
concept employed is ultimately de facto, that is, guided by actual
practice with respect to favoring the chosen religion or constrain-
ing alternative religions. The classiﬁcations are clearer in some
cases than in others. In many situations, the constitution desig-
nates an ofﬁcial state religion and restricts or prohibits other
forms. However, even without these provisions, governments
sometimes favor a designated religion through subsidies and tax
collections or through the mandatory teaching of religion in pub-
lic schools. These considerations caused Barrett to classify some
countries as having a “state religion,” despite the absence of an
ofﬁcial state religion in the constitution. Controversial cases of
this type in 2000 include Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which Bar-
rett deemed to have a Catholic state religion.
Barrett classiﬁes some governments as favoring multiple
religions or religion in general, although not maintaining a single
religion. Examples in 2000 are Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Cyprus, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. These coun-
tries lack a state religion in the sense of favoring a monopoly
religion. Therefore, we classiﬁed these cases as lacking a state
religion.
Frankly, we disagree with the classiﬁcations made by Bar-
rett in a number of cases. However, we thought it problematic to
substitute our subjective judgments about particular cases for
those made by Barrett and his team. In particular, we were
concerned that our assessments would be biased in the direction
of ﬁtting our model. Therefore, except in cases of obvious error, we
accepted the Barrett designations of state religion.
1
1. We corrected a number of typos in the classiﬁcations in Barrett, Kurian,
and Johnson [2001]. We also updated for two recent events: Sweden dropping
Lutheranism as the state religion in 2000, and Bulgaria adopting Orthodoxy as
the state religion in 2001. In addition, we departed from Barrett by classifying
Cambodia as having a state religion (Buddhist) in 2000. This designation accords
1333 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?For the recent period, there are alternatives and supple-
ments to the Barrett data. Since the passage of the International
Religious Freedom Act in 1998, the U. S. State Department
publishes its annual report, the International Religious Freedom
Report, which documents the extent of religious freedom in most
countries. Freedom House has an ongoing project to develop
indicators of religious freedom; a report for 75 countries was
published by Marshall [2000]. For our purposes, a shortcoming of
the State Department and Freedom House data is that they give
little information about the existence of state religion, per se.
Moreover, the data are available only for very recent years.
A more ambitious supplement to the Barrett data is the
Religion and State database being assembled by Fox and Sandler
[2004]. These data classify the relation between religion and state
into four broad groupings: separation of religion and state,
discrimination against minority religions, restrictions on major-
ity religions, and religious legislation. Unfortunately, the Fox-
Sandler data are available only since 1990 and cannot be used for
a long-term analysis. To make a comparison with Barrett, the
Fox-Sandler concept of state religion that comes closest is a
composite of three categories: a country has one established reli-
gion, or it has multiple established religions (comprising only
Finland and the United Kingdom in their data), or it has a civil
religion, which Fox and Sandler view as amounting to an unofﬁ-
cial state religion. This civil religion category parallels Barrett’s
de facto criterion for state religion. If we specify that a country
has a state religion in 2000 when it enters into one of these three
Fox-Sandler categories, we get that 144 of 173 countries with
data have the same designation as Barrett’s. We ﬁnd later that
our results are similar if we substitute the Fox-Sandler data for
2000 for the Barrett data. However, for a long-term analysis, the
only choice is to rely on the Barrett information.
Our study covers 188 countries that were independent in
2000.
2 The 188 represent the countries for which we have data on
state religion and other relevant variables. Among these 188, 40
percent—75 countries—are classiﬁed as having state religions in
with the U. S. State Department Survey of Religious Freedom and other sources.
Moreover, the discussion in Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [p. 165] reveals that
events after 1975 in Cambodia were not taken into account.
2. The criterion of legal independence in 2000 excludes, for example, Ber-
muda, Hong Kong, and Macao.
1334 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS2000. Going back in time, 39 percent of 189 countries—73—had
state religions in 1970, and 59 percent of 188—111—had state
religions in 1900.
3 Thus, the crude data for the twentieth century
indicate a downward trend in state religion in the ﬁrst part of the
century but no trend over the last 30 years.
Table I shows the data on state religion in 1900, 1970, and
2000 for 188 countries. In terms of transitions, the 188 countries
break down into seven groups. Group 1, 72 countries, maintained
no form of state religion throughout, that is, in 1900, 1970, and
2000. Examples are Australia, Canada, France,
4 Germany, Mex-
ico, and the United States.
5 Group 2, 58 countries, had a state
religion at all three dates: 1900, 1970, and 2000.
6 Each of these
countries maintained only one type of state religion at the three
dates: 21 had Catholic state religions, 22 had Muslim, 9 had
Protestant (including Anglican), 1 had Orthodox, 4 had Buddhist,
and 1 had Hindu.
The remaining 58 countries had some kind of transition for
state religion between 1900 and 2000. Among these, 12 countries
had two transitions; therefore, our data set has 70 transitions
overall. Group 3, 29 countries, had state religions in 1900, aban-
doned state religion by 1970, and did not reinstitute state religion
3. The 189 countries in 1970 include East and West Germany as separate
entities. Many of the 188 independent countries that existed in 2000 were not
independent in 1970 and, even more so, in 1900. For countries that were not
independent in 1970 or 1900, the designation of state religion pertains to the
regime applying to the comparable region. Some of these regions were colonies—
for example, in Africa—and others were parts of larger countries—for example,
republics of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia in 1970 or pieces of the Ottoman
Empire in 1900.
4. The French Republic separated completely from the Catholic Church in
1905. However, under the Third Republic, which started in 1871, there was a
gradual movement toward universal and secular education. Probably for this
reason, Barrett labels France as not ofﬁcially Catholic in 1900. We think it would
have been better to classify France as having a Catholic state religion in 1900.
5. In the colonial period, the Anglican Church was the ofﬁcial religion of the
largest number of colonies, notably in the South. The Congregational Church
(related to Presbyterianism) dominated in New England, except for Rhode Island,
which lacked an ofﬁcial religion. The Congregational Church was not disestab-
lished until 1818 in Connecticut, 1819 in New Hampshire, and in two parts—in
1824 and 1833—in Massachusetts. The U. S. prohibition against establishment of
an ofﬁcial religion, a part of the Bill of Rights, was not applied to state govern-
ments until the extension of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to state governments starting in the late 1800s. This extension culminated
in a Supreme Court decision in 1934. For discussions, see Norman [1968, Chap-
ters 1 and 2], Finke and Stark [1992, chapter 3], and Olds [1994].
6. We have not investigated in detail whether lapses in state religion oc-
curred in these countries at other dates in the twentieth century. Two cases are
Afghanistan lacking a state religion from the Marxist coup in 1978 until the rise
of the Taliban in the mid-1990s and Cambodia lacking a state religion from the
introduction of Communism in the mid-1970s until 1989.
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INTERNATIONAL PATTERNS OF STATE RELIGION
Country
(1)
1900
(2)
1970
(3)
2000
(4)
Pattern*
Afghanistan Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Albania Muslim none none YNN
Algeria Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Andorra Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Angola Catholic Catholic none YYN
Antigua and Barbuda none none none NNN
Argentina Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Armenia Orthodox none Orthodox YNY
Australia none none none NNN
Austria none none none NNN
Azerbaijan Muslim none Muslim YNY
Bahamas Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
Bahrain Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Bangladesh none Muslim Muslim NYY
Barbados Protestant Protestant none YYN
Belarus Orthodox none Orthodox YNY
Belgium none none none NNN
Belize none none none NNN
Benin Ethno-religion none none YNN
Bhutan Buddhist Buddhist Buddhist YYY
Bolivia Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Bosnia and Herzegovina none none none NNN
Botswana Protestant none none YNN
Brazil Catholic none none YNN
Brunei Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Bulgaria none none Orthodox NNY
Burkina Faso Ethno-religion none none YNN
Burundi Ethno-religion none none YNN
Cambodia Buddhist Buddhist Buddhist YYY
Cameroon none none none NNN
Canada none none none NNN
Cape Verde Catholic Catholic none YYN
Central African Republic Ethno-religion none none YNN
Chad Ethno-religion none none YNN
Chile Catholic none none YNN
China Confucian none none YNN
Colombia Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Comoros none none none NNN
Congo (Brazzaville) none none none NNN
Congo (Kinshasa) Catholic none none YNN
Costa Rica Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Cote d’Ivoire none none none NNN
Croatia Catholic none Catholic YNY
Cuba Catholic none none YNN
Cyprus none none none NNN
Czech Republic none none none NNN
Denmark Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
Djibouti none none none NNN
Dominica none none none NNN
Dominican Republic Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Ecuador none none none NNN
Egypt Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
El Salvador Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Equatorial Guinea Catholic none none YNN
Eritrea Orthodox Orthodox none YYN
Estonia none none none NNN
1336 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSEthiopia Orthodox Orthodox none YYN
Fiji none none none NNN
Finland Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
France none none none NNN
Gabon none none none NNN
Gambia none none none NNN
Georgia Orthodox none Orthodox YNY
Germany none none none NNN
Ghana none none none NNN
Greece Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox YYY
Grenada none none none NNN
Guatemala Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Guinea none none none NNN
Guinea-Bissau Catholic Catholic none YYN
Guyana none none none NNN
Haiti Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Honduras Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Hungary none none none NNN
Iceland Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
India none none none NNN
Indonesia Protestant none none YNN
Iran Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Iraq Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Ireland Catholic Catholic none YYN
Israel none Jewish Jewish NYY
Italy Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Jamaica none none none NNN
Japan Buddhist** none none YNN
Jordan Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Kazakhstan Orthodox none none YNN
Kenya none none none NNN
Kiribati none none none NNN
Korea (North) Confucian none none YNN
Korea (South) Confucian none none YNN
Kuwait Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Kyrgyz Republic Orthodox none Muslim YNY
Laos Buddhist Buddhist none YYN
Latvia Orthodox none none YNN
Lebanon Muslim none none YNN
Lesotho none none none NNN
Liberia Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
Libya Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Liechtenstein Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Lithuania Catholic none none YNN
Luxembourg Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Macedonia Orthodox none Orthodox YNY
Madagascar none none none NNN
Malawi none none none NNN
Malaysia Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Maldive Islands Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Mali none none none NNN
Malta Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Marshall Islands none none none NNN
Mauritania Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Mauritius none none none NNN
Mexico none none none NNN
Micronesia none none none NNN
Moldova Orthodox none Orthodox YNY
(continued on next page)
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(CONTINUED)
Country
(1)
1900
(2)
1970
(3)
2000
(4)
Pattern*
Monaco Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Mongolia Buddhist none none YNN
Morocco Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Mozambique Catholic Catholic none YYN
Myanmar none none none NNN
Namibia none none none NNN
Nepal Hindu Hindu Hindu YYY
Netherlands none none none NNN
New Zealand none none none NNN
Nicaragua none none none NNN
Niger none none none NNN
Nigeria none none none NNN
Norway Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
Oman Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Pakistan none Muslim Muslim NYY
Panama Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Papua New Guinea none none none NNN
Paraguay Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Peru Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Philippines none none none NNN
Poland none none none NNN
Portugal Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Qatar Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Romania Orthodox none none YNN
Russia Orthodox none none YNN
Rwanda Ethno-religion none none YNN
Samoa Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
St. Kitts and Nevis none none none NNN
St. Lucia none none none NNN
St. Vincent and Grenadines none none none NNN
San Marino none none none NNN
Sao Tome and Principe Catholic Catholic none YYN
Saudi Arabia Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Senegal none none none NNN
Seychelles none none none NNN
Sierra Leone none none none NNN
Singapore none none none NNN
Slovak Republic none none none NNN
Slovenia Catholic none none YNN
Solomon Islands none none none NNN
Somalia Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
South Africa none none none NNN
Spain Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Sri Lanka Buddhist Buddhist Buddhist YYY
Sudan Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Suriname none none none NNN
Swaziland Ethno-religion none none YNN
Sweden Protestant Protestant none YYN
Switzerland none none none NNN
Syria Muslim Muslim none YYN
Taiwan Confucian none none YNN
Tajikistan Orthodox none Muslim YNY
Tanzania none none none NNN
Thailand Buddhist Buddhist Buddhist YYY
Togo none none none NNN
Tonga Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
1338 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSby 2000. Examples are Brazil and Chile (which dropped the
Catholic state church), Turkey (Muslim), Indonesia (which
dropped the Dutch Reformed Church imposed by the former
colonial ruler), Russia (Orthodox), Japan (Shinto), and China and
Trinidad and Tobago none none none NNN
Tunisia Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Turkey Muslim none none YNN
Turkmenistan Orthodox none Muslim YNY
Uganda none none none NNN
Ukraine Orthodox none Orthodox YNY
United Arab Emirates Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
United Kingdom Protestant Protestant Protestant YYY
United States none none none NNN
Uruguay none none none NNN
Uzbekistan Orthodox none Muslim YNY
Vanuatu none none Protestant NNY
Venezuela Catholic Catholic Catholic YYY
Vietnam none none none NNN
Yemen Muslim Muslim Muslim YYY
Yugoslavia (Serbia) none none none NNN
Zambia none none none NNN
Zimbabwe none none none NNN
Total observations 188 189† 188
No state religion total 77 116† 113
Buddhist total 7 5 4
Catholic total 35 27 22
Confucian total 4 0 0
Ethno-religion total 7 0 0
Hindu total 1 1 1
Jewish total 0 1 1
Muslim total 31 25 29
Orthodox total 13 3 8
Protestant total 13 11 10
Summary of transitions for 1900, 1970, 2000:
Group 1 (no state religion throughout, NNN)  72
Group 2 (state religion throughout, YYY)  58
Group 3 (dropped state religion by 1970, YNN)  29
Group 4 (dropped state religion between 1970 and 2000, YYN)  12
Group 5 (dropped state religion by 1970, reinstated by 2000, YNY)  12
Group 6 (introduced state religion by 1970, NYY)  3
Group 7 (introduced state religion between 1970 and 2000, NNY)  2
* Y means some type of state religion and N means no state religion.
** Shinto.
† East and West Germany included separately, each with no state religion.
Data are from Barrett [1982, pp. 800–801] and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson [2001, pp. 834–835], from
which a number of typos were corrected. We added the information that Cambodia reinstated a Buddhist
state religion in 1989, Sweden dropped its Lutheran state religion in 2000, and Bulgaria adopted an Orthodox
state religion in 2001 (treated as the 2000 status in our table).
Some transitions that cannot be seen in the tabulations for 1900, 1970, 2000 are as follows. Afghanistan
lacked a state religion from 1978 until the mid-1990s. Cambodia lacked a state religion from the mid-1970s
until 1989. Bangladesh lacked a state religion from 1972 (the time of independence from Pakistan) until 1975.
For the United Kingdom, England has Anglican, and Scotland has Presbyterian. The Anglican religion was
disestablished in Ireland in 1869 and in Wales in 1919.
Barrett designations with which we disagree but nevertheless accepted are as follows. We would have
classiﬁed Ireland as lacking a state religion in 1900 (when it was part of the United Kingdom). We would have
classiﬁed France as having a Catholic state religion in 1900 (before the ﬁnal break with the Catholic Church
in 1905). We would have classiﬁed Guatemala as lacking a state religion in 2000 (following the new
constitution in 1993 and de facto changes thereafter).
1339 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?Korea (Confucianism). Group 4, 12 countries, had state religion in
1900 and abandoned state religion between 1970 and 2000. This
group includes Ireland (which dropped Catholic
7), Syria (Mus-
lim), and Sweden (Protestant).
Group 5, 12 countries, had a state religion in 1900, dropped
the state religion by 1970, but then reinstated a state religion by
2000. These cases are all former republics of the Soviet Union or
Yugoslavia. Four Asian countries that were previously parts of
the Soviet Union had Orthodox state religions in 1900 (as parts of
the Russian empire) but adopted Muslim state religions by 2000.
Five other former Soviet republics, including Armenia and
Ukraine, reinstated an Orthodox state religion by 2000. Croatia
had a Catholic state religion in 1900 and 2000 but no state
religion, as part of Yugoslavia, in 1970.
The ﬁnal two groups had no state religion in 1900 but intro-
duced one by 1970 (three cases) or 2000 (two cases). The three
countries that adopted a state religion by 1970 were not indepen-
dent entities in 1900: Bangladesh
8 and Pakistan, which insti-
tuted a Muslim state religion, and Israel, which adopted a Jewish
state religion. The two countries that adopted between 1970 and
2000 are Vanuatu, which introduced a Protestant state religion
upon independence in 1979, and Bulgaria, which established the
Orthodox Church (in 2001, rather than 2000).
9
II. THEORY OF THE CHOICE OF A STATE RELIGION
We start with an unregulated market for religion goods.
Within this setting, the outcome will sometimes be a monopoly;
that is, the unregulated market may be a natural monopoly. A
critical element for natural monopoly is the presence of large
ﬁxed costs, such as those applicable to the creation and dissemi-
nation of a set of religious beliefs. Relative to these ﬁxed costs, the
7. Our classiﬁcation follows Barrett’s designation of Ireland as having a
Catholic state church in 1900 and 1970. However, the ofﬁcial status of the
Catholic Church in Ireland was not established until after Irish independence in
1921. Moreover, the Anglican Church was disestablished in Ireland in 1869.
Therefore, it would have been preferable to treat Ireland as lacking a state
religion in 1900 and having one in 1970. A 1972 referendum eliminated the
Catholic Church’s ofﬁcial status in Ireland.
8. Bangladesh lacked a state religion from the time of its independence from
Pakistan in 1972 until the military coup of 1975.
9. Barrett classiﬁes Bulgaria as not having an Orthodox state religion in
1900, when the country was subject to competing inﬂuences from the Russian and
Ottoman empires.
1340 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSmarginal costs of membership and participation are likely to be
small and would not tend to be increasing. Therefore, if people
view alternative religions as close substitutes, a single type of
religion might prevail in equilibrium. Within this setting, we can
assess how changes in exogenous variables affect the likelihood of
the monopoly outcome. We argue subsequently that analogous
forces motivate a government to enforce a monopoly, that is, to
establish a state religion.
II.A. Hotelling Model of Unregulated Competition in Religions
An important constraint on the monopoly of religion goods is
heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences. This diversity applies
to religious doctrine and tradition, to degrees of strictness, and so
on. We model this heterogeneity with Hotelling’s [1929] spatial
model of variety, previously applied to religion denominations by
Montgomery [2003].
Suppose that consumer i has religion preference xi, arrayed
along a straight line, (0,x ). We assume that each religion pro-
vider can offer only a single variety. Therefore, a monopolist
supplies only one type of religion (possibly changing over time),
and the availability of multiple types requires more than one
religion, that is, the absence of monopoly.
Assume that religion provider j is located at xj and charges
the price Pj for religion goods. Consumer i’s effective price for
goods purchased from ﬁrm j, P* ij, is increasing in the “distance,”
xi  xj. We can represent this effective price by
(1) P* ij  Pj  fxi  xj,
where f is an increasing function. Given the prices, Pj and
locations xj, consumer i buys from the provider who offers the
lowest effective price P* ij. The quantity bought is given from a
downward-sloping demand curve (unlike in the standard Hotel-
ling model, where consumers buy either zero or one unit of the
good). We assume, only for simplicity, that each individual has
the same form of demand function; that is, differences across
individuals are captured fully by the xi. Given the locations of all
providers, each ﬁrm chooses its price Pj to maximize proﬁt, given
the prices of the other ﬁrms (Bertrand competition). We assume
that costs of provision, c, are constant and the same for all ﬁrms.
At an earlier stage, the religion ﬁrms that have chosen to
enter the market select their locations xj. We assume that ﬁrms
choose locations simultaneously. For example, ﬁrm 1 chooses x1,
1341 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?given the positions of the other xj and given the dependence of the
prices Pj,o nx1. An additional ﬁrm enters the market if the
prospective present value of proﬁt exceeds its ﬁxed cost, assumed
to be the same for all ﬁrms. We let N ˆ represent the number of
ﬁrms that arises in equilibrium.
An important assumption in the model is religious tolerance,
in the sense that individual utility depends only on the quantity
and type of a person’s own religion good and not on the quantities
and types of religion goods consumed by others. The model also
neglects network externalities or other spillovers—such as rein-
forcing beliefs—that cause adherents to a particular religion to
beneﬁt from the participation of other persons in the same type of
religion. However, the structure of ﬁxed costs with constant mar-
ginal costs provides analogous reasons for economies of scale.
For present purposes, we are not interested in the full equi-
librium of the Hotelling model. Rather, we are interested in
factors that determine the probabilities of the three possible types
of outcomes:
● N ˆ  1, which represents diversity of religion,
● N ˆ  1, which represents a monopoly religion, and
● N ˆ  0, which represents nonreligion.
Our primary interest is in conditions that generate a monopoly
religion provider, N ˆ  1. However, it is worth stressing that this
outcome is contending with alternatives on both sides, that is,
N ˆ  1 and N ˆ  0.
The monopoly outcome arises when one producer makes
proﬁt but a second provider cannot proﬁtably enter the market. It
is straightforward that the monopoly equilibrium will be more
likely to hold when the distribution of individual preferences, xi,
is more compressed. In the limiting case, where everyone has the
same preferences, all customers want the same type of religion
good. In general, for given ﬁxed costs and forms of demand func-
tions, more similarity in preferences makes N ˆ  1 more likely to
hold.
Two other straightforward results are that N ˆ is higher the
lower the ﬁxed cost of being a religion provider and the greater
the scale of the market (in the sense of the number of persons and
the per capita demands for religion goods). Therefore, if we con-
sider only the choice between N ˆ  1 and N ˆ  1, the monopoly
outcome is more likely the higher ﬁxed costs and the smaller the
scale of demand. However, these conclusions are reversed if the
1342 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSreligion market contracts to the extent that N ˆ  0 becomes the
alternative to N ˆ  1.
When a monopoly outcome prevails, N ˆ  1, the provider’s
chosen location x1 is central relative to the distribution of the xi.
In contrast, if the distribution of preferences is highly dispersed,
if ﬁxed costs are low, and if the scale of the market is large, the
equilibrium features two or more providers with spacing between
them.
II.B. Government
We consider in this section why the government might want
the number of religion providers, N, to deviate from the free-
market choice N ˆ . One reason is externalities in beliefs—an indi-
vidual’s beliefs may be enhanced when other people hold similar
views. These spillovers could motivate a benevolent government
to support an ofﬁcial religion as a way of strengthening faith—
and, thereby, making the typical person happier. Similar inﬂu-
ences might arise from network externalities, for example, com-
munication beneﬁts from citizens sharing a common institution,
such as a designated religion.
10
The government may also respond to religious intolerance,
modeled as a dependence of individual utility on other persons’
religious practices and beliefs. Speciﬁcally, an individual may
lose utility when other people practice different faiths. Viewed
this way, religious intolerance is similar to externalities in be-
liefs. Thus, intolerance of individuals would motivate the govern-
ment—possibly still benevolent—to favor the majority religion by
subsidizing its practices and by restricting religious expression of
minorities. These subsidies and restrictions are hallmarks of a
state religion.
Stark [2001, 2003] argues that religious intolerance is espe-
cially powerful in the three principal monotheistic faiths—Jew-
ish, Christian, and Muslim. Stark’s argument, motivated more by
the Old Testament than the Enlightenment, is that these reli-
10. The literature on product variety, summarized in Mankiw and Whinston
[1986], provides additional reasons why the unregulated outcome may not be
socially optimal. The excess of price over marginal cost in these models (and in the
Hotelling model) means that, for a given number of religion ﬁrms, the quantity of
religion goods is inefﬁciently low. In addition, the number of ﬁrms, N ˆ , typically
differs from the socially optimal number. The unregulated number tends to be too
small because an entrant counts only part of the social surplus from expanded
variety. However, an offsetting force is that an entrant counts as private reward
the proﬁt taken from incumbent ﬁrms, whereas a benevolent government ex-
cludes this “business-stealing effect.”
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therefore likely to press for a state religion as a way to suppress
“inappropriate” worship by others. According to Stark [2003, p.
32], “Those who believe there is only One True God are offended
by worship directed toward other Gods.” Thus, his argument
predicts that a state religion is more likely when the main reli-
gion is monotheistic.
Aspects of constitutional and legal structure would inﬂuence
the ability of the government to restrict religious expression of
minorities. For example, the constitution or legal history might
commit the government to maintaining civil liberties, including
religious freedoms. These constraints inhibit differential treat-
ment of majority and minority religions and, thereby, make state
religion less likely or, at least, less meaningful. However, the
empirical challenge is to isolate exogenous dimensions of legal
structure that inﬂuence the probability of state religion. The
favoring of civil liberties and the maintenance of religious free-
doms would typically emerge simultaneously as parts of liberal
regimes.
From a political standpoint, the government—not necessar-
ily benevolent—might want to use organized religion as a coop-
erative force for controlling the citizenry. This control might be
facilitated by having a monopoly religion. Exogenous features of
the political system, such as separation of powers between the
executive and other branches, would affect the government’s abil-
ity to collude with private groups, such as organized religion.
Thus, on these grounds, more separation of powers makes state
religion less likely.
Alternatively, organized religion may be a competing force
that the government seeks to constrain. This competition typiﬁes
Communism, a regime in which antireligion is a central tenet.
Communist countries, such as the Soviet Union, East Germany,
and China, attempted to destroy organized religion partly on
ideological grounds and partly as a way to weaken or eliminate
organized competition with state power. In the Soviet Union and
East Germany, the government promoted “scientiﬁc atheism” to
reinforce opposition to standard religion.
11 Since we do not count
atheism as a religion, we think of Communist governments as
attempting to enforce the outcome N  0, that is, nonreligion. We
11. See Froese and Pfaff [2003] for a discussion of East Germany and Froese
[2004] for an analysis of the Soviet Union.
1344 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStherefore predict that the probability of state religion, N  1, is
low under Communism.
12 Note, however, that N  1 is unlikely
not because Communist governments push the outcome toward
religion diversity, N  1, but, rather, toward nonreligion, N  0.
Our empirical analysis includes the presence of a Communist
regime as an explanatory variable. In practice, the antireligion
nature of Communist regimes is so powerful that our sample
contains only one example of a Communist government with a
state religion—Somalia with a Muslim state religion in 1970. We
treat the presence of Communism as exogenous with respect to
state religion. In particular, we do not allow for the possibility
that the extent of religiosity—which inﬂuences the probability of
state religion—affects the likelihood that a Communist regime
would come to power. We also investigate whether Communism
has an inﬂuence on state religion that persists after the end of the
Communist regime.
In the previous section we described a number of exogenous
variables that affect N ˆ and, thereby, the likelihood of monopoly in
an unregulated setting. A key point is that these variables inﬂu-
ence in a similar way the number of religion ﬁrms sought by the
government. Suppose, for example, that N ˆ is high because indi-
vidual religion preferences, xi, are highly dispersed or because
the ﬁxed costs of religions are low or because the overall scale of
demand is high. In these cases, the government will ﬁnd it costly
to enforce a monopoly religion, that is, to have a state religion.
Thus, our previous predictions about effects on the probability of
state religion still apply even in the presence of a government
that may or may not be benevolent.
II.C. Empirical Implementation
We use the observed dispersion of religion adherence shares
to get an empirical measure of the distribution of preferences over
types of religion. Our enumeration of adherence in 1900, 1970,
and 2000 comes from Barrett [1982] and Barrett, Kurian, and
Johnson [2001]. We use an eleven-way breakdown: Catholic,
12. If we instead viewed Communism as its own religion, we would get that
the probability of state religion under Communism is high. In our earlier research
we found that the presence of state religion—deﬁned to exclude Communism as a
religion—raised customary religious beliefs, such as in an afterlife, which in turn
enhanced economic growth. Communism does not work this way. That is, the
beliefs supported by Communism are antithetical to an afterlife and are likely to
detract from economic growth. For this reason, we think it advisable to stick with
the usual classiﬁcation of Communism as not being a religion.
1345 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?Protestant, Orthodox, other Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu,
Buddhist, other Eastern religion, other religion, and nonreligion
(which includes atheists).
13 One limitation of the Barrett data is
that they do not systematically break down Muslim adherence by
type. We use other sources to get a rough breakdown in 2000
among Sunni, Shia, and other forms.
14
The principal variable that we use is the square of the frac-
tion of the population that adheres to the most popular religion.
This variable, which we call the main-religion variable, can be
interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected persons
belong to a country’s most popular religion. The numbers that we
get for the main-religion variable depend, to some extent, on the
groupings used. If the data were available, we could think of
starting from a much ﬁner division than the eleven-way one we
used and then attempt to assess the distances between the groups
in the sense of the relevant cumulative pressure for having a
state religion. We go a little bit in this direction by examining
whether the Muslim population is best treated as a single group
(as in our main analysis) or, instead, as three distinct subgroups.
Similarly, we assess whether the Christian population is best
viewed as four distinct subgroups (as in our main analysis) or,
instead, as an amalgam of Catholic, Protestant, other Christian,
and Orthodox.
The Hotelling model says that the greater the concentration
of religion adherence the more likely that the unregulated market
will have a monopoly religion, N ˆ  1. Based on our earlier
reasoning, this effect implies that a state religion, N  1, is more
probable. We also allow for the endogeneity of religion concentra-
tion, that is, for the possibility that state religion inﬂuences this
concentration. We try to sort out the direction of causation by
using religion concentration in 1900 as an instrument for concen-
tration in 1970 and 2000.
Given the main-religion variable, we can also use the Hotel-
ling model to assess the impact of the distribution of adherence to
the remaining religions. When the adherence of this remaining
13. The Protestant category includes Anglican. The other Christian group
comprises independent Christians, marginal Christians, such as Mormons and
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and unafﬁliated Christians. Buddhist includes Shinto.
Hindu includes Jains and Sikhs.
14. The information comes from U. S. State Department International Reli-
gious Freedom Reports for 2001 and 2004, discussions in Barrett, Kurian, and
Johnson [2001], Marshall [2000], and Encyclopedia Britannica online edition for
2004.
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equilibrium would sustain a second religion; that is, state religion
would be less probable. For example, if the main religion has 50
percent of the population, state religion would be less likely if the
remaining 50 percent were in one religion, rather than scattered
among several types. Empirically, we assess this inﬂuence by
including the square of the adherence share of the second most
popular religion—called the second-religion variable. We should
note that this speciﬁcation departs from the common practice of
using a Herﬁndahl index of, in this case, religion adherence
shares. Our prediction is that the square of the main-religion
adherence share has a positive effect on state-religion probability,
whereas the square of the second-religion adherence share has a
negative effect. The Herﬁndahl speciﬁcation constrains the coef-
ﬁcients of these two variables (and of the square of other religion
adherence shares) to be the same.
Consider the predictions for how state religion relates to the
scale of the religion market. One straightforward determinant of
market size is population. Higher population raises the scale of
demand and tends, thereby, to increase the equilibrium number
of religions, N ˆ , in the Hotelling model. Therefore, in the range
where N ˆ  0 is not a relevant alternative, the prediction is that
higher population makes state religion less likely.
If we begin with a very small market, so that N ˆ  0 applies,
the conclusion is reversed. An increase in market size—caused,
for example, by higher population—makes the monopoly out-
come, N ˆ  1, more probable. Thus, in this range, higher popula-
tion makes state religion more likely.
Overall, the Hotelling model predicts a nonlinear relation-
ship between population and state religion. For very small coun-
tries, the relation is positive. However, once the population be-
comes large enough to sustain at least one organized religion, the
relation is negative. Since N ˆ  0 is likely to be a relevant
alternative only for very small countries, we anticipate that the
effect of population on the probability of state religion would be
negative in the main range of experience.
The positive relation between population and state religion
for very small countries is analogous to the effect of market size
on the propensity to regulate in the model developed by Mulligan
and Shleifer [2005]. Their key assumption is that regulation
entails ﬁxed costs. We can apply this reasoning to religion if we
think about the maintenance of a state religion as a form of
1347 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?regulation. We then get that a lower scale of demand for religion
goods—generated, for example, by a smaller population—makes
it less likely that the government would ﬁnd it worthwhile to
administer a state religion. In other words, we can think of the
outcome N ˆ  0 in the Hotelling model not as literally no religion
but as the absence of a formal structure in which the government
maintains an ofﬁcial religion.
Another determinant of market size is per capita income,
which we measure by real per capita GDP. The standard view is
that richer countries are less likely to have state religions.
15
However, the Hotelling model does not necessarily make this
prediction. The key issue is whether an increase in per capita
GDP raises or lowers the market demand for religion services.
The secularization hypothesis predicts that economic develop-
ment causes individuals to become less religious, and this view
receives empirical support in international data; see, for example,
Inglehart and Baker [2000] and Barro and McCleary [2006]. The
principal ﬁnding is that increases in standard of living lead to
small, but statistically signiﬁcant, decreases in religious partici-
pation and beliefs. Nevertheless, the effect on market demand is
ambiguous because richer nations may spend less time on reli-
gion but still spend more money on activities related to organized
religion. Thus, the overall effect of an increase in per capita GDP
on the equilibrium number of religion ﬁrms, N ˆ , is ambiguous in
the Hotelling model. Consequently, per capita GDP has an am-
biguous effect on the probability of state religion.
In the empirical analysis we treat population as exogenous
with respect to state religion (thereby ignoring possible endoge-
nous responses of migration and fertility). We allow for two-way
causation between per capita GDP and state religion by using
instrumental variables that predict per capita GDP and are ar-
guably exogenous with respect to state religion. We use as instru-
ments two geography measures—the absolute value of degrees
latitude (which matters for climate and, thereby, for health and
agriculture) and landlocked status (which matters for transpor-
tation and trade).
With respect to political structure, we use information from
Polity IV [Marshall and Jaggers 2003] on the overall polity index
(the difference between “democracy” and “autocracy”) and on the
15. This idea—a part of the secularization hypothesis—appears in Weber
[1930] and was extended in Wilson [1966], Berger [1967], and Chaves [1994].
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also be simultaneously determined with state religion. Therefore,
we use as instruments measures of a country’s colonial heritage
and legal origins.
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We focus on linear probability models for the presence of
state religion in 1970 and 2000. A limitation of these linear
speciﬁcations is that the ﬁtted values for explaining state religion
need not lie in the interval (0,1), as would be true for a probabil-
ity. This problem can be handled by a binary-model speciﬁcation,
such as a probit form. The results from probit estimation are
similar to those for the linear model. Since the linear models are
more tractable, especially for instrumental estimation, we em-
phasize these results.
III.A. Empirical Setup
Table II shows means and standard deviations of the vari-
ables used in the analysis. Table III gives estimates of linear
probability models. The dependent variable is a (0,1) dummy for
the presence of a state religion in 1970 or 2000. Thus, we inves-
tigate only whether a state religion exists, not the form of state
religion. The estimation treats the equations for state religion in
1970 and 2000 as a system, where the error terms for each
country for the two years are allowed to be correlated. The
method weighs countries the same, independently of size, geo-
graphical proximity to other countries, and so on. The seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) systems neglect the potential endo-
geneity of the right-hand-side variables. The three-stage least-
squares (3SLS) systems allow for endogeneity of some of the
explanatory variables. The sample for 2000 has 188 countries,
and that for 1970 has 189 countries (with East and West Ger-
many included separately).
One explanatory variable is the value in 1970 or 2000 of the
main-religion variable (the square of the religion-adherence
share of the most represented religion). The underlying data on
religion adherence are subject to measurement error in all coun-
tries. However, this problem is especially serious in sub-Saharan
Africa. As an example, Barrett’s [1982, p. 527] discussion for
Nigeria notes that lack of census information is a major problem.
More signiﬁcantly for our purposes, the Barrett classiﬁcations for
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MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF VARIABLES (UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES
ACROSS COUNTRIES)
2000 (N  188) 1970 (N  189) 1900 (N  188)
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
State religion 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.59 0.49
Main-religion adherence 0.66 0.22 0.66 0.24 0.83 0.17
Square of above 0.48 0.28 0.51 0.31 0.71 0.25
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.44
Log (population) 8.57 2.09 7.99 2.10 — —
Square of above 77.7 34.5 68.2 32.6 — —
Log (per capita GDP) 8.44 1.07 7.95 0.84 — —
Communist 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00
Communist, 15-year lag 0.22 0.42 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00
Second-religion adherence 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.12
Square of above 0.035 0.044 0.036 0.047 0.030 0.049
Main religion monotheistic 0.87 0.34 0.82 0.39 0.69 0.46
Main religion Muslim 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41
Polity IV polity index 0.41 0.36 ————
Polity IV executive index 0.43 0.36 ————
Absolute degrees latitude 25.5 16.8 25.6 16.9 25.5 16.8
Landlocked status 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41
British colony 0.31 0.47 0.31 0.46 — —
French colony 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 — —
Spanish or Portuguese colony 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 — —
Other colony 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 — —
British legal origin 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 — —
French legal origin 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.50 — —
German legal origin 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 — —
Scandinavian legal origin 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 — —
Regime change since 1900 0.72 0.45 0.60 0.49 — —
Adherence shares:
Catholic 0.289 0.332 0.298 0.354 0.259 0.378
Protestant 0.137 0.207 0.130 0.219 0.127 0.264
Orthodox 0.054 0.163 0.051 0.152 0.065 0.200
Other Christian 0.084 0.112 0.070 0.108 0.028 0.073
Muslim 0.235 0.346 0.221 0.345 0.214 0.357
Jewish 0.005 0.056 0.006 0.062 0.005 0.014
Hindu 0.022 0.095 0.022 0.105 0.022 0.101
Buddhist 0.036 0.141 0.037 0.153 0.041 0.164
Other Eastern religions 0.019 0.071 0.016 0.072 0.014 0.089
Other religions 0.057 0.110 0.076 0.146 0.222 0.361
Nonreligion 0.062 0.105 0.073 0.156 0.003 0.027
The dummy variable for the presence of a state religion comes primarily from Barrett [1982] and Barrett,
Kurian, and Johnson [2001]; see the text for discussion. Population numbers (in 1000s) are from World Bank,
World Development Indicators. The main-religion variable is the share of the population that adheres to the
most popular religion; the second-religion variable is the share of the second most popular religion. Main
religion is monotheistic if a dummy variable for whether the most popular religion is Jewish, Christian, or
Muslim. Main religion is Muslim if a dummy variable for whether the main religion is Muslim. Data on
religion adherence are from Barrett, as above. GDP data (1996 dollars) are from Heston, Summers, and Aten
[2002]. The dummy variable for a Communist regime is from Kornai [1992] and CIA World Fact Book; see the
text. Polity IV data for 1965 are from Marshall and Jaggers [2003]. Data on latitude are from the web site:
www.bcca.org/misc/qiblih/latlong_oc.html. Prior colonial status is from Barro [1997, Table 3.5]. Legal-origins
variables are from La Porta et al. [1998]. The left-out category is socialist legal origin. The regime-change
variable is a dummy variable for whether an independent country in 2000 had, since 1900, 1) achieved
independence from a former colonial authority; 2) split off as an independent entity from a larger country; or
3) adopted or dropped a Communist regime.
1350 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSsub-Saharan Africa seem to overclassify people as adhering to
Christianity or Islam, as opposed to maintaining dual adherence
with an indigenous faith.
16 For this reason, the Barrett data
likely overstate the concentrations of religion adherence in 1970
and 2000. As an attempt to correct this problem, we include a
dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa. The three-stage least-
squares estimates may also help to correct for measurement
error. In some speciﬁcations, we add the second-religion variable
(the square of the adherence share for a country’s second most
popular religion).
Another explanatory variable is the presence of a Communist
regime.
17 We include contemporaneous and ﬁfteen-year lags of
this variable (for 1970 and 1955 in the 1970 equation and for 2000
and 1985 in the 2000 equation).
To measure market size, we use the log of population. Since
the Hotelling model implies a nonlinear relation between state
religion and market size, we also include the square of the log of
population.
We include the log of per capita GDP as an additional deter-
minant of market size. However, as discussed before, the effect of
per capita GDP on the demand for religion services is ambiguous.
The data on GDP are the purchasing-power adjusted numbers
from Heston, Summers, and Aten [2002]. Many countries lack
these data—in our sample, 74 countries in 1970 and 40 in 2000.
Moreover, the selection of which countries lack GDP data is not
random—for example, only 5 of the 35 countries designated as
16. For unweighted averages of 48 sub-Saharan African countries that ex-
isted in 2000, the Barrett data show that the fraction of the adhering population
professing the Catholic religion rose from 0.06 in 1900 to 0.23 in 2000; the fraction
Protestant, other Christian, or Orthodox rose from 0.04 to 0.28; the fraction
Muslim increased from 0.20 to 0.30; and the fraction associated with indigenous
and other religions fell from 0.69 to 0.16.
17. In 2000 we classiﬁed 5 of the 188 countries as having Communist re-
gimes, based on the descriptions of governmental systems in CIA World Fact
Book. The ﬁve are China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam. In 1970 we used
Kornai’s list [1992, Table 1.1] to classify 34 of 189 countries plus one-half of
Vietnam as having Communist governments. Since our data for Vietnam are not
separated into North and South, we entered the Communism dummy for Vietnam
in 1970 as one-half, corresponding to the roughly equal breakdown of the popu-
lation between North and South. Many of the Communist “countries” in 1970 were
parts of larger states (republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) or were
Eastern European countries that were heavily inﬂuenced by the Soviet Union.
Also classiﬁed as Communist were China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Mongolia,
North Korea, North Vietnam, and Somalia. South Yemen was also Communist in
1970, but our data for 1970 refer only to non-Communist North Yemen (roughly
80 percent of the combined population of Yemen). Our data for Communism in
1955 also come from Kornai’s list, and our data for Communism in 1985 come from
CIA World Fact Book and individual country sources.
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LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS FOR STATE RELIGION IN 1970 AND 2000
(COEFFICIENTS SHOWN WITH STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS
Main religion
adherence squared
0.683** 1.007** 0.659** 1.173** 0.683** 1.087**
(0.086) (0.165) (0.111) (0.272) (0.088) (0.174)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.354** 0.178* 0.354** 0.167 0.354** 0.163
(0.072) (0.088) (0.072) (0.091) (0.072) (0.088)
log (population) 0.187** 0.161* 0.186** 0.159* 0.187** 0.163*
(0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) (0.067)
log (population)
squared
0.0114** 0.0098* 0.0113** 0.0095* 0.0114** 0.0101*
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0042)
log (per capita GDP) 0.053* 0.015 0.055* 0.033 0.053* 0.031
(0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.040) (0.025) (0.037)
Communism 0.354** 0.263** 0.360** 0.215* 0.354** 0.245**
(0.057) (0.071) (0.059) (0.092) (0.057) (0.072)
Lagged Communism 0.152* 0.005 0.156* 0.038 0.152* 0.023
(0.061) (0.073) (0.062) (0.086) (0.061) (0.074)
Second religion
adherence squared
—— 0.22 1.59 — —
(0.63) (1.69)
Main religion is
monotheistic
—— — — 0.001 0.157*
(0.063) (0.079)
No. observations:
1970, 2000 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188
R
2: 1970, 2000 0.40, 0.38 0.37, 0.36 0.40, 0.38 0.36, 0.34 0.40, 0.38 0.36, 0.35
1352 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSCommunist in 1970 have data for 1970. Since the idea is to
include an indicator of standard of living, rather than per capita
GDP, per se, we used information on life expectancy at birth and
other variables to construct proxies for the standard of living in
TABLE III
(CONTINUED)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Estimation method SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS SUR 3SLS
Main religion
adherence squared
0.631** 0.992** 0.667** 0.934** 0.650** 0.910**
(0.090) (0.169) (0.087) (0.164) (0.086) (0.156)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.359** 0.181* 0.351** 0.183* 0.355** 0.188*
(0.072) (0.088) (0.072) (0.086) (0.071) (0.085)
log (population) 0.176** 0.157* 0.225** 0.224* 0.215** 0.220*
(0.064) (0.067) (0.082) (0.090) (0.082) (0.089)
log (population)
squared
0.0109** 0.0096* 0.0132** 0.0129* 0.0126** 0.0127*
(0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0050)
log (per capita GDP) 0.045 0.017 0.046 0.018 0.037 0.022
(0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.037)
Communism 0.357** 0.264** 0.352** 0.268** 0.354** 0.270**
(0.056) (0.071) (0.056) (0.067) (0.056) (0.066)
Lagged Communism 0.151* 0.006 0.174** 0.016 0.220** 0.041
(0.061) (0.073) (0.062) (0.085) (0.065) (0.097)
Main religion is
Muslim
0.115* 0.047 ————
(0.059) (0.072)
Polity: constraints on
executive†
—— 0.143 0.012 — —
(0.081) (0.166)
Polity: overall polity
index†
———— 0.258** 0.068
(0.085) (0.166)
No. observations:
1970, 2000 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188 189, 188
R
2: 1970, 2000 0.40, 0.38 0.37, 0.37 0.41, 0.38 0.39, 0.37 0.42, 0.39 0.40, 0.38
* p-value  0.05, ** p-value  0.01.
† Observations with missing Polity data have the sample mean for the variable entered. A separate
dummy variable (not shown) is included for these observations.
Constant terms are included but not shown. The dependent variable is a dummy for the presence of state
religion in 1970 or 2000. The estimates weight each country equally. When the estimation method is denoted
SUR, the equations are estimated using the seemingly unrelated technique, which allows for different error
variances for the two periods and for correlation of the error terms over the periods for each country. When
the estimation is denoted 3SLS, the equations are estimated using three-stage least-squares. The endogenous
and instrumental variables are described below.
The following explanatory variables are for 1970 in the ﬁrst equation and 2000 in the second equation:
main and second religion squared, log of population, log of real per capita GDP, the dummy variable for a
contemporaneous Communist regime, and the dummy variables for whether the main religion is monotheistic
or Muslim. Lagged Communism is for 1955 in the 1970 equation and for 1985 in the 2000 equation. The Polity
variables (from Polity IV, described in Marshall and Jaggers [2003]) are for 1965. These variables are
measured on a (0,1) scale, with 0 denoting least constraints on the executive or least democratic. In column
(2), the variables treated as endogenous are main-religion squared and log of per capita GDP. Instruments
are main-religion squared in 1900, a dummy variable for landlocked status, and absolute degrees latitude. In
column (4), second-religion squared is treated as endogenous, and second-religion squared in 1900 is added
as an instrument. In columns (10) and (12), the Polity variables are treated as endogenous. The additional
instruments are four dummy variables for legal origins (British, French, German, and Scandinavian) and
four dummy variables for colonial history (former colony of Britain, France, Spain, or Portugal, and other
rulers). The legal-origins variables are from La Porta et al. [1998].
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computed from regressions of the log of per capita GDP on the
contemporaneous log of life expectancy at birth, the absolute
value of degrees latitude, the dummy for landlocked status, and
dummy variables for Communism. The R
2 values for these re-
gressions are reasonably high—0.70 in 1970 and 0.80 in 2000—
and the ﬁtted values should serve adequately as proxies for the
standard of living.
18
From Polity IV [Marshall and Jaggers 2003] we used the
indicator for constraints on the chief executive. The original scale
from 1 to 7 was converted to 0 to 1, with 1 signifying the most
constraints. We also used the overall polity index from Polity
IV—the difference between the measures of democracy and au-
tocracy. The original scale from 10 to 10 was converted to 0 to
1, with 1 signifying the most democracy or least autocracy.
III.B. Linear Probability Models
The baseline speciﬁcation in Table III, columns (1) and (2),
excludes political variables, except for Communism. For the SUR
estimation in column (1), the main-religion variable has a statis-
tically signiﬁcant, positive coefﬁcient. The point estimate of 0.68
means that a one-standard deviation increase in the square of the
main-religion adherence share (by 0.28 in 2000, see Table II)
raises the probability of state religion by 0.19. This result sup-
ports the hypothesis that greater concentration of adherence in
the main religion raises the probability of state religion. However,
this interpretation assumes that the coefﬁcient reveals the inﬂu-
ence from religion concentration to state religion, rather than the
reverse. In the three-stage least-squares estimates, we treat the
main-religion variable as endogenous.
The coefﬁcient on the dummy variable for sub-Saharan Af-
rica, 0.35 (s.e.  0.07), issigniﬁcantly negative. Thus, for given
concentration in the main religion, presence in sub-Saharan Af-
rica is associated with a lower probability of state religion. As
mentioned, our interpretation is that the main-religion variable,
based on the reported religion adherence numbers, systemati-
cally overstates the share of the main religion in sub-Saharan
African countries.
18. Life expectancy has the most explanatory power in these regressions
(positive). However, absolute degrees latitude is also important (positive), as is
Communism in 1985 in the 2000 equation (negative).
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niﬁcant effects on the probability of state religion. The effects are
nonlinear in the way predicted by the Hotelling model: in Table
III, column (1), the coefﬁcient on the log of population is positive,
0.187 (s.e.  0.064) and that on the square is negative, 0.0114
(0.0040). These coefﬁcients imply that, for very small countries,
an increase in population raises the probability of state religion.
However, when the population exceeds 3.6 million, the point
estimates imply that an increase in population reduces the like-
lihood of state religion. In 2000 the median population was 6.6
million, and 62 of the 188 countries had populations below 3.6
million. In 1970 the median was 4.2 million, with 88 of 189 below
3.6 million. Thus, a majority of countries—and a much larger
majority of the world’s population—are in the range where higher
population makes state religion less likely.
For the log of per capita GDP, the predicted effects on state
religion were ambiguous because the impact of per capita GDP on
the scale of the religion market was unclear. In Table III, column
(1), the coefﬁcient on the log of per capita GDP is signiﬁcantly
negative: 0.053 (s.e.  0.025). However, this result does not
hold up in our instrumental estimation.
The contemporaneous presence of a Communist government
has a statistically signiﬁcant, negative effect, 0.35 (s.e. 
0.06). Our sample has, in 1970, 34 of the 189 countries, plus
one-half of Vietnam, classiﬁed Communist. In 2000, 5 of the 188
countries are designated Communist. As mentioned, the only one
of these countries that had a state religion contemporaneously
with Communism was Somalia in 1970.
19
We also estimated lagged effects of Communism by entering
a dummy variable for 1955 in the 1970 equation and for 1985 in
the 2000 equation.
20 The results show a signiﬁcantly negative
coefﬁcient, 0.15 (s.e.  0.06), about half the magnitude of the
contemporaneous effect. In our sample, the main distinctions
between contemporaneous and lagged Communism come from
the 28 countries in 2000 that were no longer Communist because
of the collapses in the 1990s of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
19. The autocrat Siad Barre, who came to power in Somalia in 1969, argued
that his brand of socialism was consistent with Islam. Thus, initially, there were
no changes in the ofﬁcial status of Islam. However, in the pursuit of “scientiﬁc
socialism” in the 1970s, Siad Barre moved increasingly to weaken the political
inﬂuence of religious leaders.
20. The 1985 value of the Communism dummy for uniﬁed Germany is set to
0.20, the population share of the eastern parts.
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ables suggests that the negative inﬂuence of Communism on
state religion has about 50 percent persistence after ten years.
21
The 3SLS estimates in Table III, column (2), treat the main-
religion variable and the log of per capita GDP as endogenous.
One instrument is a long lag of the main-religion variable—the
value applying in 1900. We would prefer to use instruments
related to the main-religion variable other than long lags but
have not come up with any.
22 The instrument list also includes
the two geography measures mentioned before—the absolute
value of degrees latitude and the dummy variable for landlocked
status.
We can examine ﬁrst-stage regressions to gauge the explana-
tory power of the instruments for the endogenous variables. For
the main-religion variables in 2000 and 1970, the R
2 values for
the ﬁrst-stage equations are 0.4–0.5. The most important explana-
tory variable in these regressions is the main-religion variable for
1900, which has signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients: 0.59 (s.e. 
0.07) in the 1970 equation and 0.52 (0.07) in the 2000 equation.
The other important explanatory variable is the dummy variable
for sub-Saharan Africa, which is signiﬁcantly negative.
For the log of per capita GDP in 1970 and 2000, the R
2 values
in the ﬁrst-stage regressions are 0.5–0.7. The signiﬁcant vari-
ables are the absolute value of degrees latitude (positive), the
dummy for sub-Saharan Africa (negative), the dummy for land-
locked status (negative), and the dummy for lagged Communism
(negative).
Comparing columns (1) and (2) of Table III, one difference is
that the point estimate of the coefﬁcient on the main-religion
21. These results hold constant the adherence share of the main religion, but
another channel for persisting inﬂuence of Communism on state religion involves
religion adherence. Communism tends particularly to shift persons away from
adherence to any religion and toward nonreligion. For example, Russia had an
Orthodox state religion in 1900 when the adherence shares were 76 percent in the
main religion—Orthodox—and 0 percent nonreligion. Under Communism, these
numbers went by 1970 to 28 percent Orthodox and 52 percent nonreligion. Then,
after the fall of Communism, the Orthodox share recovered by 2000 to 50 percent,
and the nonreligion share fell to 33 percent. Thus, the effect of Communism on
religion adherence, particularly nonreligion, seems to die out gradually and may
not be permanent. We are presently studying the dynamic effects of Communism
on religion adherence.
22. One possibility would be the composition of cumulated immigration.
However, we lack the data to implement this idea.
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23 This result may
be surprising because, if there were a positive reverse effect of
state religion on adherence to the main religion, the SUR esti-
mate would tend to be biased upward. The likely explanation is
that the instrumentation corrects for measurement error, which
is important in the data on religion adherence. This error tends to
bias the SUR coefﬁcient on the main-religion variable toward
zero. This interpretation may also explain why the 3SLS results
show a coefﬁcient of smaller magnitude for the sub-Saharan
African dummy. In the SUR estimation, the African dummy
likely serves as a proxy (in a negative direction) for true religion
concentration.
The coefﬁcient on the log of per capita GDP was negative and
marginally signiﬁcant in the SUR results (Table III, column (1))
but is insigniﬁcantly positive in the 3SLS estimates (column
(2)).
24 The likely explanation is that the coefﬁcient of the GDP
variable in the SUR estimation is biased downward because of a
negative effect of state religion on per capita GDP. If we enter the
state-religion dummy variable for 1900 into the ﬁrst-stage regres-
sions for the log of per capita GDP, the coefﬁcients are 0.26
(s.e.  0.09) in the 1970 equation and 0.14 (0.10) in the 2000
equation.
The coefﬁcient of lagged Communism was signiﬁcantly posi-
tive in the SUR estimation (Table III, column (1)) but is essen-
tially zero in the 3SLS results (column (2)). Note that current and
lagged Communism are included in the instrument lists. There-
fore, the different results reﬂect the interaction between lagged
Communism and the instrumentation for the endogenous vari-
23. Our main-religion variable uses the concept that emerges naturally from
the underlying theory—the share of adherents to the most popular religion in
total population. Arguably, a less endogenous variable is the share of adherents to
the most popular religion in the population that adheres to some religion, that is,
after excluding the fraction designated as nonreligion. If we replace the main-
religion variable in the SUR estimates (Table III, column (1)) by this alternative
concept, we get a somewhat lower coefﬁcient on the main-religion variable (0.607,
s.e.  0.085) andaslightly poorer ﬁt (R
2 values of 0.38 in 1970 and 0.37 in 2000).
A better procedure is to modify the three-stage least-squares estimation (Table
III, column (2)) to retain the original main-religion variable but to replace the
associated instrument with the main-religion variable for 1900 calculated from
the share in the population that adheres to some religion. This procedure yields
results that are very close to those reported in Table III, column (2).
24. One concern is that, over long periods, landlocked status is endogenous
because it reﬂects changes in country borders. For example, Bolivia currently
lacks access to the sea because it lost its coastline in a war with Chile in the late
1800s. Moreover, this military defeat might be related to Bolivia’s potential per
capita GDP. The results change little if we drop the landlocked dummy variable
from the instrument lists.
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the instrumental estimates indicate that a history of Communism
may have little remaining effect on the probability of state reli-
gion after 10–15 years.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table III show that the second-religion
variable has a coefﬁcient that is insigniﬁcantly different from
zero, whereas the Hotelling model predicted a negative effect. The
problem is the large standard errors for the second-religion coef-
ﬁcients. For given concentration in the main religion, there is not
enough variation in the share of the second most popular religion
to tell whether this feature of religion concentration matters for
the probability of state religion.
Columns (5)–(8) of Table III check whether the type of main
religion—monotheistic (Judeo-Christian) or, more speciﬁcally,
Muslim—matters for the probability of state religion. The coefﬁ-
cient of the dummy variable for monotheism as the main religion
is essentially zero in the SUR estimation (column (5)) and mar-
ginally signiﬁcant with the wrong sign (relative to Stark’s hy-
pothesis) in the 3SLS results. The coefﬁcient of the dummy vari-
able for Muslim as the main religion is marginally signiﬁcant
with a positive sign in the SUR results but insigniﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero in the 3SLS estimation. Our conclusion is that state
religion depends primarily on the extent of concentration in the
main religion, not the identity of the main religion.
Columns (9)–(12) of Table III add two political structure
indicators from Polity IV. In column (9) the estimated coefﬁcient
for constraints on the chief executive in 1965 is negative but not
statistically signiﬁcant. In column (11), the estimated coefﬁcient
for the overall polity index in 1965 is signiﬁcantly negative.
25
However, the coefﬁcients on neither of the political variables are
statistically signiﬁcant when we treat these indicators as endoge-
nous and instrument with an array of variables for legal origins
and colonial heritage (columns (10) and (12)). Thus, a reasonable
interpretation of the negative coefﬁcients in columns (9) and (11)
is that more liberal political regimes (greater constraints on the
executive or a higher polity score) correlate with the absence of
25. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin [2004, Table III] report a statistically
signiﬁcant negative relation between a measure of regulation of religion and the
Freedom-House indicators for electoral rights/civil liberties. However, their re-
sults are hard to relate to ours because their measure of religious regulation is
whether a state religion exists (as designated by Barrett) or whether a country is
indicated by Barrett to have lots of atheists.
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cal features to the probability of state religion.
As discussed before, our analysis treats Muslim as a single
religion. We broke down Muslim adherence into three subtypes—
Sunni, Shia, and other—using rough information on the compo-
sition of Muslim adherence around 2000 (see footnote 14). Since
we lacked data for 1970, we assumed that the breakdown among
the three types in 1970 was the same as in 2000. Among the 48
countries in 2000 for which Muslim was the most popular reli-
gion, 31 had at least 90 percent estimated adherence to one type,
mostly Sunni. Thus, the new treatment signiﬁcantly affects about
one-third of the Muslim countries. The countries in which this
treatment lowers the adherence share of the most popular reli-
gion by 25 percent or more were Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and Yemen.
26
We calculated a revised main-religion variable that treats
the three Muslim subtypes as distinct religions. If we add this
variable to the SUR system in Table III, column (1), we get that
the coefﬁcient on the original main-religion variable is 0.82
(s.e.  0.27) andthat on the new variable is 0.15 (0.28). Hence,
the model clearly prefers the original speciﬁcation, where the
pressure for state religion reﬂects overall Muslim adherence. This
conclusion is particularly important for Iraq, because the Muslim
share of the population is 0.96, but the Shia share is only 0.61.
We carried out this exercise in reverse for our four Christian
groups: Catholic, Protestant, other Christian, and Orthodox. We
recalculated the main-religion variable with these four denomi-
nations treated as a single religion. If we add this variable to the
SUR system in Table III, column (1), we get that the coefﬁcient on
the original variable is 0.83 (s.e.  0.11) and that on the new
variable is 0.28 (0.13). Hence, these results indicate that the
pressure for state religion comes from concentration within one of
the Christian religions and not from Christian representation
overall.
27
We mentioned that some of Barrett’s designations of state
religion are controversial. To get some idea of the sensitivity of
26. For Lebanon, the identity of the main religion shifts from Muslim to
Catholic, but the magnitude of the adherence share of the main religion changes
little.
27. In fact, the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient on the new variable suggests
that, if the most popular religion is one of the Christian faiths, a state religion is
particularly unlikely when a second Christian faith is also highly represented.
1359 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?the results to these measurement concerns, we focused on three
difﬁcult cases: Barrett’s classiﬁcations of Spain, Portugal, and
Italy as having Catholic state religions in 2000. For Spain, move-
ments away from the ofﬁcial status of the Catholic Church oc-
curred after President Franco’s death in 1975—in particular, a
1978 referendum ratiﬁed a new constitution in which the state no
longer was deemed to have an ofﬁcial religion. Barrett argues,
however, that the situation remained one in which the Catholic
Church had a special relationship with the government—for ex-
ample, the constitution says: “The public authorities will keep in
mind the religious beliefs of the Spanish society and will main-
tain cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions.”
Similarly, in Portugal, movements away from the monopoly sta-
tus of the Catholic Church occurred after the death of President
Salazar in 1969. The monopoly position of the Church was weak-
ened by the Law of Religious Liberty in 1971 and, even more so,
by actions taken by the left-wing government that came to power
with the coup in 1974. However, Barrett observes that the promi-
nent legal position of the Catholic Church was only modiﬁed, not
eliminated. Again in Italy, the ofﬁcial status of the Catholic
Church was weakened in the 1970s by modiﬁcations of the con-
cordant that had been in place since 1929. Barrett argues, how-
ever, that the ofﬁcial position of the Catholic Church remained
preeminent.
To see whether the results are sensitive to these classiﬁca-
tions, we reran the systems from Table III, columns (1) and (2),
with the designations for Spain, Portugal, and Italy changed to no
state religion in 2000. This change has little effect on the re-
sults—the main difference is that the coefﬁcient on the log of per
capita GDP in the SUR estimation becomes larger in magnitude:
0.072 (s.e.  0.025). However, this coefﬁcient is still essen-
tially zero, 0.010 (0.037), when we use instrumental variables.
We also noted that the Fox and Sandler [2004] data can be
used to form a different measure of state religion in 2000.
28 We
redid the estimation of Table III, columns (1) and (2), with the Fox
and Sandler data used for 2000 (and the Barrett data used in
1970 and in 2000 for countries not covered by Fox and Sandler).
The results are similar to those found before. The main changes
28. Fox and Sandler classify Italy as not having a state religion but Spain and
Portugal as having unofﬁcial state religions in 2000. Thus, our implementation of
the Fox and Sandler data classiﬁes Spain and Portugal, but not Italy, as having
state religions in 2000.
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Communism variables are smaller in magnitude: for the results
that parallel column (1), the new estimates are, respectively,
0.28 (s.e.  0.07) and 0.10 (0.07). Overall, our inference is
that reasonable modiﬁcations of Barrett’s classiﬁcations of state
religions are unlikely to change the main ﬁndings.
III.C. Probit Estimates of Probability Models
Table IV shows probit estimates of systems that parallel the
speciﬁcations in Table III, columns (1) and (2). The coefﬁcients in
Table IV, column (1), come from an ordinary probit and those in
column (3) come from a probit with instrumental variables.
TABLE IV
PROBIT MODEL FOR STATE RELIGION IN 1970 AND 2000
(COEFFICIENTS SHOWN WITH STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Independent variable
Ordinary probit Probit with I.V.
(1)
Coefﬁcient
(2)
Marginal
effect on
probability
(3)
Coefﬁcient
(4)
Marginal
effect on
probability
Main religion adherence
squared
2.63** 0.631 3.51** 0.752
(0.38) (0.70)
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.18** 0.291 0.79** 0.176
(0.30) (0.41)
log (population) 0.79** 0.189 0.78** 0.166
(0.28) (0.27)
log (population) squared 0.051** 0.0123 0.050** 0.0107
(0.018) (0.017)
log (per capita GDP) 0.21 0.051 0.10 0.022
(0.11) (0.22)
Communism 1.88** 0.362 1.57** 0.306
(0.54) (0.52)
Lagged Communism 0.20 0.049 0.05 0.010
(0.28) (0.30)
No. observations: 1970, 2000 189, 188 189, 188
* p-value  0.05, ** p-value  0.01.
Constant terms are included but not shown. The speciﬁcation in column 1 corresponds to that in Table
III, column 1; the speciﬁcation in column 3 corresponds to Table III, column (2). The coefﬁcient standard
errors allow for correlation of the error terms over time for each country. Column (1) is an ordinary probit.
Column (3) is a probit with instrumental variables. The endogenous variables are the main-religion variable
and the log of per capita GDP. The instruments are those used in Table III, column (2). For the continuous
variables, columns (2) and (4) show the sample mean of the effect on the probability of state religion from a
marginal change in each explanatory variable. For the dummy variables, columns (2) and (4) show the sample
mean of the effect on the probability of state religion from a shift from zero to one in each explanatory
variable.
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tween the ordinary probit in Table IV, column (1), and the linear
probability model in Table III, column (1), is that the coefﬁcient
on lagged Communism is not statistically signiﬁcant in the pro-
bit. For the probit with instrumental variables in Table IV, col-
umn (3), the pattern of statistical signiﬁcance is the same as that
for the linear probability model in Table III, column (2).
Much easier to interpret than the probit coefﬁcients in Table
IV are the implied marginal effects of each explanatory variable
on the probability of state religion. The values in columns (2) and
(4) are the sample averages of the marginal effects for the con-
tinuous variables—the main-religion variable, the log of popula-
tion and its square, and the log of per capita GDP. For the dummy
variables, the values are the sample average effects from a
change in each dummy variable from 0 to 1. Most of the marginal
effects shown in columns (2) and (4) are close to the corresponding
coefﬁcients of the linear probability models in columns (1) and (2)
of Table III. Hence, the coefﬁcients in the linear probability
models correspond well to the average marginal effect of each
explanatory variable in the probit speciﬁcations.
III.D. Adjustment Costs for Institutions
The theory that underlay our empirical analysis suggested a
number of variables that inﬂuence the probability of state reli-
gion. We can think of these variables as determining the likely
long-run status of state religion in a country. In the short run,
however, there is inertia in changing state religion, just as there
is in modifying other political and legal institutions. Even for a
benevolent government, it would not be optimal to change insti-
tutional procedures and legal rules each time there is a shift in an
exogenous variable that affects the procedures and rules that
would be optimal if one were erecting institutions from scratch.
Therefore, we expect that institutions will not change in most
years but will adjust in a discrete manner on rare occasions. In
our context, the history of state religion has an important effect
on the current status of state religion over at least a 100-year
horizon.
Although institutional changes are costly, a change in any
one feature—such as the implementation or removal of a state
religion—is easier when other regime changes are already taking
place. For example, for a former colony, independence entails the
creation of a new form of government, which typically involves
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system. At such times, the government can also select the status
of state religion that is optimal without paying a large adjust-
ment cost. Similarly, when a large country breaks apart—such as
the disintegrations of the Ottoman Empire, the Soviet Union, and
Yugoslavia—the newly independent states can readily change the
legal treatment of religion.
To capture this force, we classiﬁed countries in 1970 and
2000 as to whether they had experienced at least one major
regime change since 1900. The question of what constitutes a
major regime change is subjective. To enhance our objectivity, we
labeled as a major regime change only an occurrence of one of the
following three events: a transition from colonial status to inde-
pendence, a split-off of a new state from a larger country, and the
adoption or elimination of Communism. Based on these criteria,
our classiﬁcation for 1970 has 113 of 189 countries or 60 percent
with at least one major regime change since 1900. In 2000, 136 of
188 countries or 72 percent had experienced such a change. Most
of the classiﬁcations of major regime change are straightforward
but some are not. For example, we do not label as major regime
changes war-related occupations of countries and the associated
postwar shifts in governing institutions. Cases of this type in-
clude Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, each of which we classify
as having no major regime change since 1900. We explore later
how our results change if we shift the classiﬁcations for these
cases. In any event, we treat major regime change as exogenous
with respect to the determination of state religion.
We use an empirical speciﬁcation that allows for persistence
of state religion over time but that distinguishes countries with at
least one major regime change from those without such a change.
Let St be a zero-one dummy variable for the presence of state
religion for a country in year t. Let Rt be a (0,1) dummy variable
for whether the country has experienced at least one major re-
gime change since 1900. In a linear form, the speciﬁcation of the
deterministic part of our dynamic probability model is then
(2) St  S1900   1   1  Rt  2   Rt	
 1  1   1  Rt  2   Rt	   
Zt  constant,
where S1900 is a dummy variable for the presence of state religion
in 1900, the coefﬁcients 1 and 2 (0  1  1 and 0  2  1)
determine the persistence over time in the probability of state
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tively (Rt  0o rRt  1), and the coefﬁcients 
 determine the
long-run inﬂuence of the explanatory variables, Zt, considered in
Table III.
The coefﬁcients 1 and 2 would differ depending on whether
St is observed in 1970 or 2000, the two years that we study. Since
70 years have elapsed since 1900 in 1970 and 100 years in 2000,
we anticipate that 1 and 2 would each be higher in 1970 than in
2000. That is, more of the persisting inﬂuence from the status of
state religion in 1900 would remain in 1970. We estimate one pair
of coefﬁcients, (1,2), for 1970 and another pair for 2000. The
other coefﬁcients, given by 
 in equation (2), are the same for the
two years, because they represent the long-run effects of the
variables Zt on the probability of state religion.
The results for linear probability models are in Table V. We
use the baseline speciﬁcation for the long-run inﬂuences from
Table III, columns (1) and (2). Column (1) of Table V estimates by
the seemingly unrelated (SUR) technique, and column (2) uses
three-stage least-squares (3SLS). The main new results concern
the coefﬁcients on the state-religion variable for 1900. These
coefﬁcients differ for 1970 and 2000 and also differ depending on
whether a change in political regime occurred since 1900. These
coefﬁcients provide information about the inertia in institutions,
as represented here by state religion.
Given the other explanatory variables, the existence of a
state religion in 1900 matters a great deal for the probability of
state religion in 1970 and 2000. For a country that has experi-
enced no major regime change since 1900, the SUR coefﬁcients for
state religion in 1900 are 0.914 (s.e.  0.053) for 1970 and 0.723
(0.086) for 2000. These coefﬁcients are each statistically signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero with p-values less than 0.01.
29 The
coefﬁcient in the 1970 equation is higher than that for 2000 with
a p-value for the difference of 0.008.
30 This result signiﬁes that
less of the effect from the initial condition in 1900 would have
decayed by 1970 than by 2000.
For a country with at least one major regime change, the
SUR coefﬁcients for state religion in 1900 are 0.294 (s.e. 
29. Using a one-sided Wald test, each coefﬁcient is also signiﬁcantly less than
one (p-value of 0.055 for 1970 and 0.001 for 2000).
30. This result applies for a Wald test of equal coefﬁcients against the
alternative hypothesis that the coefﬁcient for 1970 is larger than that for 2000,
that is, a one-sided test.
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statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero with p-values less
than 0.01.
31 Each coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly lower, with p-values
less than 0.01, than its counterpart for countries with no major
regime change (point estimates of 0.914 and 0.723, respectively).
Thus, as expected, the status of state religion in 1900 is substan-
tially more important for countries with no major regime change
than for those with such a change. Among countries with regime
changes, we would have expected a smaller coefﬁcient for 2000,
but the two estimated coefﬁcients (0.294 and 0.316) do not differ
signiﬁcantly from each other. This outcome may signify that, for
31. The coefﬁcients are also signiﬁcantly less than one.
TABLE V
DYNAMIC VERSIONS OF LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS
(COEFFICIENTS SHOWN WITH STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
Independent variable
(1)
SUR estimation
(2)
3SLS estimation
State religion in 1900, no
regime change
Coefﬁcient for 1970: 0.914 (0.053)** 0.948 (0.063)**
Coefﬁcient for 2000: 0.723 (0.086)** 0.690 (0.105)**
State religion in 1900,
regime change
Coefﬁcient for 1970: 0.294 (0.049)** 0.242 (0.055)**
Coefﬁcient for 2000: 0.316 (0.054)** 0.289 (0.064)**
Main religion adherence
squared
0.841 (0.113)** 1.257 (0.201)**
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.571 (0.084)** 0.408 (0.095)**
log (population) 0.249 (0.086)** 0.167 (0.089)
log (population) squared 0.0144 (0.0053)** 0.0097 (0.0054)
log (per capita GDP) 0.067 (0.036) 0.055 (0.047)
Communism 0.508 (0.083)** 0.381 (0.089)**
Lagged Communism 0.212 (0.089)* 0.107 (0.100)
No. observations: 1970, 2000 189, 188 189, 188
R
2: 1970, 2000 0.73, 0.56 0.71, 0.54
*p-value  0.05, ** p-value  0.01.
The systems take the form of equation (2) in the text. Coefﬁcients of state religion in 1900 differ for 1970
and 2000 and also depending on whether a major change in political regime occurred since 1900. (See the
notes to Table II and the text for a discussion of the regime-change variable.) Column (1) is estimated by the
SUR technique, analogous to Table III, column (1). Column (2) is estimated by three-stage least-squares,
analogous to Table III, column (2). The endogenous variables are the main-religion variable and the log of per
capita GDP. The instruments are those described in the notes to Table III, plus the state-religion variable in
1900, the regime-change variable, and interactions between the regime-change variable and the exogenous
variables.
1365 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?countries with regime changes, the most important inﬂuence on
the probability of state religion is the fact of such a change
(interacted with the other explanatory variables), rather than the
time elapsed since 1900. The results for the coefﬁcients on state
religion in 1900 from the 3SLS estimation in Table V, column (2),
are similar.
We should stress that the results imply that countries with
no regime change are more likely than those with a change to
retain the status of state religion that existed in 1900. The re-
sults—and the underlying model—do not imply that countries
with regime changes are more or less likely to have state religion.
If we add the dummy variable for regime change directly into the
equations in Table V, we get estimated coefﬁcients that differ
insigniﬁcantly from zero—0.08 (s.e.  0.21) with SUR and 0.06
(0.18) with 3SLS—and the other coefﬁcients change negligibly.
For countries with no major regime change, we can view the
estimated coefﬁcients on state religion in 1900 as gauging the
rate at which the historical presence of state religion becomes
unimportant for the current environment. The point estimates of
0.914 for 1970 and 0.723 for 2000 (Table V, column (1)) imply
decay rates of 0.13 percent and 0.32 percent per year, respec-
tively. These results can be extrapolated to the long-term evolu-
tion of state religion. If we assume a decay rate of 0.2 percent per
year, the probability of observing state religion in 2000 would
depend on the presence of state religion at the time of the Refor-
mation—say, 470 years earlier—with a coefﬁcient of 0.39. Thus,
the establishments around 1530 of the Lutheran Church in Scan-
dinavia and the Anglican Church in England would still matter
substantially for the likely character of current state religion. An
even earlier event—the Great Schism between the western
(Rome) and eastern (Constantinople) branches of the Catholic
Church in 1054—would matter in 2000 with a coefﬁcient of 0.15.
One caveat is that the changes during the Reformation and
the Great Schism refer to shifts in the forms of state religion, not
to movements from state religion to no state religion. It may be
that the probability of eliminating state religion entirely was
close to zero for a long time in the years before the twentieth
century. Another point is that the calculations apply only to
countries that do not experience major regime changes. If
changes occur to the basic form of government (which could itself
be modeled probabilistically), the inﬂuence from the presence of
state religion in the long ago past would be negligible.
1366 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSWe mentioned that our classiﬁcation of regime change was
debatable in some cases—speciﬁcally, we were uncertain about
the labeling of Japan, South Korea, and Turkey as having expe-
rienced no major regime change since 1900. If we change the
classiﬁcations of these three cases to having regime changes by
1970, our ﬁtted model improves. For example, in the SUR speci-
ﬁcation in Table V, column (1), the R
2 values rise from 0.73 to
0.76 in the 1970 equation and from 0.56 to 0.58 in the 2000
equation. The ﬁts improve because the three countries at issue
had state religions in 1900 but dropped them by 1970. Thus,
classifying these countries as having experienced a regime
change makes it easier to ﬁt the transitions in state religion.
Otherwise, the change in status for these three cases does not
materially affect the results.
IV. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
We used a Hotelling-style model of spatial competition to
assess the probability of a monopoly outcome in the religion
market. In this model, we can assess how changes in exogenous
variables affect the likelihood of monopoly. We argued that these
inﬂuences carry over in a political setting to a government’s
decision on whether to establish a state religion.
The empirical analysis examined the presence or absence of
state religion in 188 countries in 1970 and 2000. Consistent with
the theory, an increase in the fraction of the population that
adheres to a country’s main religion raises the probability of state
religion. This relation does not depend much on the identity of the
main religion, for example, whether it is monotheistic or, more
speciﬁcally, Muslim. Instrumental estimates, using adherence to
the main religion in 1900 as an instrument, suggest that the rela-
tion between religion concentration and state religion reﬂects cau-
sation from concentration to state religion, rather than the reverse.
Presence in sub-Saharan Africa has a negative effect on the
probability of a state religion. Our interpretation is that the
standard data on religion adherence for sub-Saharan Africa un-
derstate dual adherence to indigenous faiths and, therefore, over-
state the adherence rate for the main religion.
Communism has a strong negative effect on the probability of
state religion. Our sample contains only one example (Somalia in
1970) with state religion in the usual sense. The negative inﬂu-
1367 WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE STATE RELIGIONS?ence from past Communism on state religion may have little
impact after 10–15 years.
The theory and empirical results imply that market size,
gauged by population, has a nonlinear effect on the probability of
state religion. For very small countries, an increase in population
raises the probability of state religion. However, when the popu-
lation exceeds 3–4 million, an increase in population reduces the
likelihood of state religion.
For per capita GDP the predicted effect on state religion is
ambiguous because the impact of standard of living on the de-
mand for religion services is unclear. Consistent with this ambi-
guity, our instrumental estimation does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant ef-
fects of per capita GDP on the probability of state religion.
In a setting of costly adjustment for institutions, the proba-
bility of state religion in 1970 and 2000 depends substantially
on the status in 1900. Dynamic estimates show that, for given
religion concentration and other explanatory variables, a state
religion is more likely to exist in 1970 or 2000 if it existed in 1900.
This inertia is much stronger for countries that experienced no
major change in political regime than for those that experi-
enced such a change. For countries with no major regime
change, the rate of decay is slow enough so that religious
institutions from the distant past—such as at the time of the
Reformation in the 1500s—matter a great deal for the shape of
present day institutions.
Our results about regime change relate to the two historical
events highlighted at the outset. The Swedish King Gustaf Vasa
in 1527 and the English King Henry VIII in 1534 introduced
forms of Protestantism as state religions in place of Roman Ca-
tholicism. Vasa acted just after a major regime change associated
with separation from Denmark, following a period of expensive
and bloody warfare through 1520. Henry VIII made his change in
state religion at a turbulent time (through 1542) in which En-
gland was changing its relations with Wales, Ireland, and Scot-
land, implementing English as the ofﬁcial language, and institut-
ing a uniform bureaucracy. Thus, these events support the gen-
eral thesis that changes in state religion tend to occur at times of
major changes in political regimes. However, Vasa and Henry
VIII both retained state religions—they just changed the forms
from one Christian type to another.
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